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Notes
From the Mayan Machaquila Stele to Egyptian
Pharaoh Amenhotep's Head: United States
Courts' Enforcement of Foreign National
Patrimony Laws After United States v. Schultz
KAVITA SHARMA*

[T]he demand for cultural artifacts has resulted in the irremedial
destruction of archaeological sites and articles, depriving the situs
countries of their cultural patrimony and the world of important
knowledge of its past.'
INTRODUCTION

Sweat dripped down my face. My hands and knees were covered in
mud. It was hot and I was tired. I should not be here. My supervisor did
not think I was physically fit enough to make the journey with all my
equipment, but obstinacy would not let me quit. I had been climbing for
two hours up a steep rocky hill trying to find the trenches and remains of
a British fort used to fend off German troops during World War I in East
Africa. I was in Taita in the Tsavo region of Kenya, near the Tanzanian
border.' On my way to the trenches I came across a small, shallow cave
filled with skulls. Our ethnographic interviews indicated that
Agropastoral Taita, until recently, would disinter the skulls of their dead

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005. This Note was
inspired by the archaeological and ethnographic research I performed in Kenya in 2002 under Dr.
Chapurukha Kusimba's supervision during a one year internship at the Field Museum of Natural
History in Chicago. I would like to thank Senior Notes Editor, David Ward, for pushing me to write
the best note possible. I would like to also thank adjunct U.C. Hastings professor, Karl Christiansen,
my reluctant mentor and friend, for his helpful comments. Most importantly, I would like to thank
Sandy and Curren for encouraging me to write this Note when I was feeling a little sad during a
dreary, snowy spring break.
i. S. REP. No. 97-564, at 23 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078,4100.
2. Tsavo is famous for its man-eating lions that attacked railroad workers in 1898. They were
featured in the 1996 movie THE GHOST AND THE DARKNESS (Paramount Pictures 1996).
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relatives and display them in ancestral shrines that served to establish
and validate a family's identity claims to productive land I was
fascinated by the skulls and picked one up to observe more closely. But
as I did, I was overcome by pangs of guilt. By picking up a skull that was
in plain view, was I desecrating the remains of someone's ancestor?
Shouldn't the skulls of a community's ancestors be left undisturbed?
Archaeologists often study human remains and burials in order to gain
insight into past cultures that did not leave behind a written, historical
record. Knowing this, however, did not ease my guilt. I was shocked
when my guide told me that it was not uncommon for wazungu (the
Swahili word for white person or foreigner) tourists, to come to this area
and steal skulls to sell or to keep for their own personal collections.
Most people would agree that removing skulls and digging up
human remains is theft. Whom is this theft from, however? Who owns
burial sites and human remains? These skulls are the ancestors of the
current Taita people. These skulls are part of the cultural heritage of a
people and a nation. Moreover, what about digging up sites in order to
find treasures, sacred objects, or exquisite pieces of art left behind by
civilizations or cultures that no longer exist? Would this be considered
stealing, looting, or commercial enterprise? Who owns the relics of
cultures past?
When a site is raided, the provenance, i.e. the context, history, and
the cultural affiliation, of an artifact is lost.4 Careless, hasty looting
destroys valuable information of a past civilization or culture.' As a
result, nations that are rich in cultural property such as art, manuscripts,
artifacts, relics, treasures and antiquities, have enacted national
patrimony laws to protect the exportation of such property out of their
country.6 Such countries include India,7 Japan, Egypt,9 Mexico, t" Italy,"
and Turkey."2 National patrimony laws, in effect, give the state title to
3. See Lynn Goldstein, Landscapes and Mortuary Practices:A Casefor Regional Perspectives,in
REGIONAL APPROACHES TO MORTUARY ANALYSIS 107, 113-14 (Lane Anderson Beck ed., 1995).
4. PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 25 (1983).

5. Jamison K. Shedwill, Is the "Lost Civilization" of the Maya Lost Forever?: The U.S. and Illicit
Trade in Pre-ColumbianArtifacts, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 227, 229 (1992).
6. The 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Convention defined cultural property as "property which, on religious or secular grounds, is
specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history,
literature, art or science." Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, I97O, art. i, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 234
(1972).

Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958. (No. 24 of 1958).
Bunkazai Hogo H-o (Cultural Property Protection Law) No. 214 of May 30, 1950.
The Law on the Protection of Antiquities, Law 117 (1983).
Law on Archaeological Monuments, D.O. iI de mayo de 1897.
II. Law of June 1, 1939, No. iO89, Art, 44.
12. Cultural and Natural Assets Law, No.2863, TURKISH CIv. CODE, Art. 697 (1983).
7.
8.
9.
io.
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any object defined as cultural property discovered within its borders.'3
The illicit international trade in antiquities and art is second in volume in
cash flow only to the international drug trade.'4 Worldwide trade in
stolen art and antiquities in estimated to be between $860 million and
$2.6 billion annually.'5 The increasing demand for art and antiquities has
fueled a dramatic
increase in site raiding, illegal exportation, and sale of
6
cultural items.
In the United States, courts in the past have been reluctant to
prosecute cases or seize objects in which title is vested in the state
through national patrimony laws because the United States does not
have a category of "found" property based on national patrimony. In the
last thirty years, courts have struggled to find ways to repatriate cultural
property based on national patrimony laws. 7 The recent Second Circuit
case United States v. Schultz is the latest example of how courts have
dealt with a foreign country's claim of ownership to artifacts based on its
patrimony laws.' Schultz gives countries clear guidelines they must
follow in order to have their cultural property restored to them.'9
According to Schultz, a foreign nation must show that it was the owner of
the cultural property in question at the time it was stolen or removed
from that country and the country was actively enforcing such laws, so
they are not illusory."
The disadvantage to this is that the Second Circuit's stringent
requirements make it difficult for foreign nations to retrieve their stolen
cultural property because of problems with proof of ownership.
Moreover, countries, often with few resources, must actively implement
their own laws. Even so, Schultz and the cases leading up to it
demonstrate the new trend that courts in the United States are willing to
honor a foreign nation's patrimony laws. Schultz is significant because,
by providing clear guidelines, it increases the ability of foreign nations to
successfully retrieve their stolen artifacts through United States' courts.
In addition, Schultz prompts foreign nations to take steps to strengthen,
clarify, and enforce their own laws to protect. their cultural property.
13. Shedwill, supranote 5, at 241-42.
14. Nina R. Lenzer, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does the Unidroit
Convention Providean Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 472-73 0994).
15. Claudia Fox, Note, The Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects:
An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural Property,9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 225,
226

993).

16. Paige L. Margules, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Export of Cultural
Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 609,
6o9-1o (1992).
17. See discussion infra Section II.
i8. 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cit. 2003).
19. Id. at 401-02.
20. Id.
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Part I of this Note explores American categories of ownership
pertaining to artifacts and antiquities found where the original owner is
difficult to ascertain. Part II discusses the line of cases leading up to
Schultz where nations have sought to prove ownership through national
patrimony laws. For the most part, U.S. courts have been reluctant to
honor a nation's patrimony laws because such laws are often vague in
asserting title, and it is difficult to prove the item of cultural property
actually came from the requesting nation. Part III analyzes the Schultz
case and the additional requirements placed on a foreign nation trying to
assert title through its national patrimony laws.
I. CLASSIFYING AND DETERMINING WHO OWNS "FOUND" PROPERTY

Under common law, when there was a dispute between the finder
and landowner over property rights in an object, the true owner of which
could not be easily ascertained, possessory rights depended on the
category of the property.' In other words, the original owner's intent, at
the time he became physically separated from his property, mattered.2
At common law there were four categories of found property: (I)
abandoned property; (2) lost property; (3) mislaid property; and (4)
treasure trove.23

Abandoned property is property in which "the owner has voluntarily
relinquished all right, title, claim and possession, with the intention of
terminating his ownership, but without vesting ownership in any other
person. ' ' 4 Lost property is defined as "property which the owner has
involuntarily parted with through neglect, carelessness, or inadvertence,
that is, property which the owner has unwittingly suffered to pass out of
his possession, and of whose whereabouts he has no knowledge.""5
Mislaid property is property which is "intentionally put into a certain
place and later forgotten.2 6 Treasure troves are defined as "any gold or
silver in coin, plate, or bullion, whose owner is unknown, found
concealed in the earth or in a house or other private place, but not lying
on the ground." 7
The famed case of Armory v. Delamirie, where a chimney sweeper's

21.

(2003)

I AM. JUR. 21 Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property to Adjoining Landowners § 15
[herinafter "Abandoned"].

22. Id.

23. Benjamin v. Linder Aviation, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Iowa 1995).
24. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned § 1 (lOO3); see also Terry v. Lock, 37 S.W- 3 d 202, 206 (Ark. 2001).
25. t AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned § 4 (2003); see also Favorite v. Miller, 407 A.2d 974, 976 (Conn.
1978); Ritz v. Selma United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa i99i).
26. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned § 6 (2003); see also Terry, 37 S.W-3d at 2o6; Hardy v. Potter, 236
P.2d 525, 530 (Wyo. 195I).
27. I AM. JUR. 20 Abandoned § 7 (2003); see also Weeks v. Hackett, 71 A. 858, 859 (Me. 19o8).
Not all states have statutes recognizing treasure troves. See, e.g., Corliss v. Wenner, 34 P.3d 1 100, 1105
(Idaho 2001); Schley v. Couch, 284 S.W.2d 333,335 (Tex. 1955).
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boy found a jewel and took it to a goldsmith's shop to be valued, but the
goldsmith's apprentice kept the stone, asserted that the finder of lost
property had a possessory interest greater than anyone else except the
true owner, regardless of the place of finding and the landowner's
rights.28 The "Finder's Rule" also applied to property categorized as
treasure trove, or abandoned." The finder of mislaid property, however,
is required to turn it over to the owner of the premises (landowner) for
safekeeping in hopes the original owner will come back to the place
where he mislaid his property."
The recent trend among courts, however, is to award found property
that is embedded, regardless of what category it belongs to and
regardless of who found it, to the landowner.' The presumption is that
embedded property belongs to the landowner.3" Embedded property is
defined as property that has become a part of the natural earth.33
Examples of embedded property include pottery, a prehistoric boat,
valuable earthenware and gold-bearing quartz.34 The rationale favoring
the embedded rule to other categories of found property is to prevent
trespassers from profiting by entering and disturbing private property.35
A recent case illustrating the embedded rule is Corliss v. Wenner.36
In Corliss, the defendant Wenner hired an asphalt paving company to
construct a driveway on his ranch.37 An employee, Corliss, while
excavating soil on the driveway unearthed a glass jar containing ninetysix gold coins dating from 1857 to 1914.38 Corliss's employer gave the
coins to Wenner (the ranch owner) and Corliss sued.39 The court rejected
classifying the gold coins as a treasure trove, which would be subject to40
the finder's rule, deeming such classifications as "anachronistic.'
Instead, the court followed the embedded rule and held that the
landowner has constructive possession of all property found beneath his
28. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722). See also Terry, 37 S.W.3 d at 206; Corliss, 34 P.3d at 1104; 1 AM.
JUR. 2D Abandoned § i8 (2003).
29. See i AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned § i6, § 26 (2o03); Terry, 37 S.W.3d at 206; Corliss, 34 P.3d at
I1o4; Benjamin v. Lindner Aviation, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 400,406 (Iowa, 1995).
30. See i AM. JUR. 20 Abandoned § 24 (2003); Terry, 37 S.W.3d at 2o6; Lindner Aviation, 534

N.W.2d at 406.
31. See Favorite v. Miller, 407 A.2d 974, 978 (Conn. 1978); Corliss, 34 P.3 d at io6; Bishop v.
App. Ct. 1968); Allred v, Biegel, 219 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Mo. Ct.
Ellsworth, 234 N.E.2d 49, 51-52 (I11.
App. 1949); Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., 33 Ch. D. 562 (Eng. I886).
32. Morgan v. Wiser, 711 S.W.2d. 220, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
33. See I AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned § 29 (2003).
34. Id.; Corliss,34 P.3 d at 11 O4.
35. Favorite, 407 A.2d at 978; Morgan, 711 S.W.2d. at 223.
36. 34 P.3d iloo (Idaho 2ooI).
37. Id. at 1102.
38. Id. Corliss claimed the value of the coins were in between $500,00o-$i,ooo,ooo, while Wenner
argued they were worth between $25,ooo-$3o,00o. Id. at 1102 n. i.
39. Id. at 1102.
40. Id. at i lO6.
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land.'
In the past thirty years, several states and the federal government
have become more aware and appreciative of this country's cultural
property. Both state and federal government have enacted laws
protecting artifacts, antiquities and other objects of historical or
archaeological significance embedded in public land. These statutes give
title to such cultural property to the state or federal government and
impose criminal sanctions for trespassing and removal of artifacts.42
Under the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (1979), the United
States has title to "archaeological resources" removed or excavated from
federal land subject to the provisions of the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). 43 "Archaeological
resources" are "material remains of human life or activities which are at
least ioo years of age, and which are of archaeological interest."' Many
states that contain archaeological sites have also enacted similar statutes
vesting property rights in the state and exclusive excavation rights of
artifacts, and archaeological landmarks embedded or found on state
land." For example, Montana declares all "heritage property and
paleontological remains" found on land owned or controlled by the state
as permanent property of the state.46 The effect of such state and federal
statutes not only codifies the judicially created embedded rule but also
protects against looting by imposing civil and criminal penalties for
violators who trespass or remove artifacts.
More recently, Louisiana and Alabama have gone as far as enacting
their own versions of patrimony laws that affect cultural property found
on private lands.47 While many states have laws protecting the
desecration and removal of human remains, even in unmarked graves,
the ownership of burial goods has not been addressed. 4s Presumably,
burial goods would belong to the landowner under the embedded rule
41. Id.
42. See i8 CFR § 1312.4 (2oo2); ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-6-303 (Michie 2003); MONT. CODE ANN.
§22-3-442 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 27.53.0490, 27.53-095 (West Supp. 2004).
43. 18 CFR §§ 1312.13(a), (e). Federal lands do not include Indian lands. I8 CFR § 1312.I3(b).
NAGPRA applies to Native American human remains and Native American cultural property found
on federal lands after 199o. I8 CFR § 1312.I3(e).
44. I8 CFR § 1312.3(a). Examples of archaeological resources include, but are not limited to,
surface and subsurface structures, weapons, pottery, graves, human skeletal material. 18 CFR
§ 1312.3(a)(3).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-6-301 (Michie 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §22-3-432 (2003); TEX NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 191.092 (Vernon 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 27.53.040, 27.53.045 (West
2004).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-432(I), (3)(2003).
47. ALA. CODE § 41-3-1 (Michie 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:681 (West Supp. 2004).
48. One court has declared that burial goods are not "abandoned property," but it is unclear
whether such goods then belong to the landowner. See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 6oi, 605 (La. Ct.
App. 1986).
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which gives the landowner constructive possession of everything found
on, above and under his land.49 In 1989 Louisiana enacted Section 8:68I
addressing the disposition of unmarked burials."0 It states, "All burial
artifacts found in an unmarked burial site shall become the property of
the state and the board shall be the custodian thereof."'5' The state also
has the authority to donate such artifacts to educational institutes, public
museums, or a Native American tribe for the purposes of study and
display, but it cannot sell such artifacts. 2 Louisiana's statute is limited to
burial goods, but it contravenes the well-recognized embedded rule that
the land-owner possesses everything found above and under his land.
Alabama's statute is even more invasive because it gives the state
ownership of all artifacts found on non-federal land in Alabama, and the
right to excavate them:
The State of Alabama reserves to itself the exclusive right and
privilege of exploring, excavating or surveying ... all aboriginal
mounds and other antiquities, earthworks, ancient or historical forts

and burial sites within the State of Alabama, subject to the rights of the
owner of the land upon which such antiquities are situated ... and the
ownership of the state is hereby expressly declared in 3any and all
objects whatsoever which may be found or located therein.
Under Alabama law state excavations of sites where antiquities are
found would be subject to rights of the landowner. Even so, the statute
suggests that the state would have title to artifacts found on private land.
Both these state statutes illustrate the growing awareness and
appreciation for cultural property in the United States and the need for
state protection 4
Foreign nations face difficulties in trying to retrieve their cultural
property that has been stolen and smuggled into the United States
because such property does not easily fit into the four categories
mentioned above. Due to the passage of time it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to ascertain who the current owner is, or what the
owner's original intent was.55 In addition, certain types of cultural
49. See Favorite v. Miller, 407 A.2-1 974, 978 (Conn. 1978); Corliss v. Wenner, 34 P.3d iloo, iio6
(Idaho 2001); Bishop v. Ellsworth, 234 N.E.2d 49, 51-52 (II. App. Ct. 1968); Allred v, Biegel, 219
S.W.2d 665,666-67 (Mo. Ct. App. s949); Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., 33 Ch. D. 562 (Eng. 1866).
50.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:68I (West Supp. 2004).
L

5

Id. § 8:68 1(C).

52. Id.
53. ALA. CODE § 41-3-I (Michie 2000).

54. A discussion on whether Louisiana's and Alabama's statutes giving title to certain cultural
property found on private lands are valid state property regulations or violations of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause (prohibiting the state from taking private property for public use without
just compensation) is beyond the scope of this paper. Such issues will not be addressed here since little
is known about the legislative history behind both statutes, the enforcement of these statutes on
private lands, and there are no cases to date testing such statutes.
55. The United States recognizes one more category of property pertaining to found objects:
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property such as burial goods do not fit neatly into one of these
categories. The problem foreign states have in using the embedded rule
to assert ownership is that it is difficult to know when and where these
objects of cultural property were found, because the cultural and
historical context has been lost in the course of looting. Eighty to ninety
percent of antiquities sold at auctions lack any provenance.: In addition,
some pieces of cultural property may be in the custody of private owners,
making it difficult for such a litigant to come to the United States and
assert his or her right. National patrimony laws alleviate these problems
by vesting title in the state.
II.

THE COURTS STRUGGLE IN ACCEPTING A FOREIGN NATION'S
CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP BASED ON NATIONAL PATRIMONY LAWS

Courts in the past thirty years have had to address national
patrimony laws in criminal prosecutions under the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA), and civil forfeiture statutes. Courts have had to
evaluate whether a foreign nation's patrimony law sufficiently gave title
to an artifact that would make such object "stolen" and therefore a
cognizable claim within the courts' jurisdiction. Courts have gradually
progressed from not addressing national patrimony laws, to finding them
vague and unclear, to setting up requirements of what a foreign country
needs to show in order to retrieve its stolen cultural property.
Several cases dealing with the validity of national patrimony law
arose out of prosecutions under the NSPA 7 The NSPA, enacted in 1948,
states, "whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods ... of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the
same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud... [s]hall be fined8
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.",
Furthermore, "[w]hoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters,
cultural items under NAGPRA. Cultural items include cultural patrimony (items having ongoing
historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to group or tribe or culture that cannot be owned
by an individual), sacred objects, or funeral goods. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001(3), 3002(a) (200o). Under
NAGPRA, any cultural items found after the enactment of the Act (i99o) on tribal or federal land
would belong to direct lineal descendents. § 3002(a)(I). If none can be found, then the items belong to
the tribe on whose lands it was discovered or to the tribe with the closest cultural affiliation to those
objects. § 3002(a)(2). Cultural affiliation is defined as a "shared group identity that can be reasonably
traced historically or prehistorically between a present day [Native American] tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group." §300(2). The extent of NAGPRA,
however, is limited to cultural property found on federal lands. Whether the United States should
honor requests by a foreign nation of cultural property based on cultural affiliation or its country of
origin is not within the scope of this Note. For a discussion on repatriation based on such concepts see
John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Eligin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. i88i (1985).
56. Peter Wilson, Raiders of the Lost Art, THE TIMEs (London), Feb. 15, 2002.
57. United States v. McClain (McClain I1), 593 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 81o (N.D. Cal. 1989).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) (emphasis added).
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sells, or disposes of any goods .. . which have crossed a State or United
States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken,
knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken" is
subject to fine or imprisonment." The NSPA was designed to discourage
the receiving, taking and conversion of stolen property. 6° Several courts
have determined that "stolen," as used in the NSPA is broad in scope
with a "wide-ranging meaning."6' The NSPA applies to stolen goods
transported in either interstate or foreign commerce, making it
applicable to cases involving stolen cultural property taken from a
foreign nation and transported into the United States.
The first case in which courts had to deal with national patrimon2
laws under the NSPA was United States v. Hollinshead in 1974.
Hollinshead, a dealer in pre-Columbian artifacts, and his co-conspirators
organized the removal and transportation to California of a rare preColumbian stele known as Machaquila Stele 2 found in a Mayan ruin in a
jungle of Guatemala. 6' Hollinshead and his co-conspirators were
convicted under the NSPA for conspiracy to transport stolen property in
interstate commerce, and for causing the transportation of stolen
property in interstate commerce.64
The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction for several reasons. First of
all, the court relied on expert testimony that according to Guatemalan
law, the Machaquila Stele and other such artifacts were property of the
state and could not be removed without permission of the government."
Second, the court asserted that there was "overwhelming evidence" that
the defendants knew it was against Guatemalan law to remove the Stele
and that they knew it was stolen. 6' The court did not examine or discuss
Guatemalan national patrimony law, which gave the government
ownership of pre-Columbian discovered and undiscovered artifacts.
Instead the court based its ruling on the determination that the Stele was
government property, the defendants knew it, and they knew it was
stolen. 6 One scholar points out that the Hollinshead case was a "fluke,"
because the Machaquila Stele 2 was well-known and documented, and
thus was easily proven to be the property of Guatemala without the court
59. § 2315 (emphasis added).

6o. United States v. O'Connor, 874 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gardner, 516
F.Ed 334,349 (7th Cir. 1975).
61. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411-12 (i957); United States v. McClain (McClain 1),
545 F.2d 988, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1977).
62. 495 F.2d 1154, 1154 (9th Cir. r974).
63. Id. at 1155. A stele is a carved or inscribed stone slab usually having some ceremonial or

religious purpose.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1155-56.
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analyzing Guatemala's national patrimony laws. 68 Subsequent cases after
Hollinshead involved objects of cultural property which were
examine claims of ownership
undocumented forcing courts to carefully
69
based on national patrimony laws.
The next case brought to the attention of United States courts was in
1977 in United States v. McClain (McClain I).7o Five conspirators were
convicted under the NSPA for stealing pre-Columbian artifacts from
Mexico and selling them in the United States." The ringleader, Joseph
Rodriguez, had gangs of workers unearthing artifacts from various
archaeological sites in Mexico.72 Once excavated, the pre-Columbian
artifacts were taken to an archaeological institute in Mexico, where
forged documents regarding the artifacts' history were created. 3 The
artifacts were then transported to Europe and "auctioned" to give them
fictitious bills of sales so they could be sold without suspicion in the
United States.74 FBI investigations showed that the defendants were
aware their actions were illegal." The defendants were arrested during
negotiations with an undercover FBI officer in Los Angeles to purchase
the pre-Columbian artifacts. 6 The trial court convicted the defendants
under the NSPA for conspiring to transport and receiving through
interstate commerce stolen pre-Columbian artifacts. 77
In the first appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendants argued that
Congress never intended the NSPA to apply to items deemed "stolen"
solely because of a country's declaration of ownership 5 The Fifth Circuit
found that NSPA did apply to ownership by foreign legislative
declarations even if the objects in question had never been reduced to
physical possession by that government and could potentially be in the
custody of a private party. 79 The Fifth Circuit was willing to honor a
foreign nation's patrimony laws, noting that Congress had intended the
NSPA to protect owners, including foreign governments, of stolen

68. Bator, supra note 4, at 70.
69. United States v. McClain (McClain 11), 593 F. 3 d 658, 659 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Turkey v. OKS Partners (OKS

Partners 1), No. 89 -3 o6i-WJS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032, at*3 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994); Peru v.
Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 81o, 812-15 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Croatia v. Trustee of Marquess of Northhampton
1987 Settlement, 61o N.Y.S.2d 263, 265-66 (App. Div. 1994).
70. United States v. McClain (McClain 1), 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977)
71. McClain II, 593 F.2d at 659.
72. ld. at 66o.
73. Id. at 661.
74. Id. at 66o-6i.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 663.
77. McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 991-92.
78. Id. at 994.
79. Id. at 995.
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property.' ° On remand, the trial court convicted Rodriguez and the other
defendants."'
The second appeal before the Fifth Circuit, McClain II, addressed
the issue of when Mexico enacted its national patrimony laws and
whether such laws were sufficiently clear in giving title to the Mexican
government.2 The prosecution would have to show that the defendants
knew the items were stolen, or that possessing or removing such artifacts
was contrary to Mexican law, and that such artifacts were owned by the
government at the time of removal. 83 The defendants argued that
Mexican laws were "vague and inaccessible except to a handful of
and therefore the
experts who work for the Mexican government,"
84
conviction violated their rights of due process.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendants in spite of testimony
from Mexican government officials and scholars that, since 1897, Mexico
has been able to legally assert title to all cultural property found in
Mexico.5 The Fifth Circuit found that the statutes enacted in 1897, 1930,
1934, and 1970 were confusing and misleading as to whether the state

owned pre-Columbian art, and those statutes seemed more like laws to
prevent illegal export. 86 The court, however, determined Mexico's 1972
statute was "clear and unequivocal in claiming ownerships of all
artifacts." s The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction on the substantive
charge of having received or stolen goods placed in foreign commerce,
finding that the jury most likely convicted the defendants based on the
1897 Mexican law which was too vague to impose criminal liabilityY. Yet
the Fifth Circuit upheld the conspiracy conviction under the NSPA
because evidence showed the defendants knew the artifacts stolen-they
knew about 1972 patrimony law, they attempted to conceal their actions
and they falsified the origin of the artifacts.8 McClain H demonstrated
the Fifth Circuit's willingness to honor convictions under the NSPA for
stolen artifacts transported into the United States, if national patrimony
laws were clear and unambiguous, and the defendants knew the artifact
8o. Id. at 996, ioo.
81. McClain II, 593 F.2d at 659.
82. Id. at 664-66.

83. Id. at 659.
84. Id. at 663-64.
85. Id. at 667.
86. Id. at 670.
87. Id. at 67o-7i. Article 27 of Mexico's 1972 statute (entitled Federal Law on Archaeological,
Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones) states, "[a]rchaeological monuments, movables and
immovables are the inalienable and imprescriptible property of the Nation." McClain 1,545 F.2d at
iooo. Article 28 further clarifies that, "[miovable and immovable objects, product of the cultures prior
are archaeological
to the establishment of the Spanish culture and National Territory, ...
monuments." Id.
88. McClain 11, 593 F.2d at 671.

89. Id.
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was stolen.
The 1989 case of Peru v. Johnson was different than Hollinshead and
McClain in that it involved a civil forfeiture action rather than the
prosecution of individuals under the NSPA.9 This case articulated the
requirements for a foreign nation to assert ownership of a cultural
artifact under its national patrimony laws. 9' Peru brought an action in the
United States, alleging that the eighty-nine pre-Columbian artifacts,
which United States Custom Officials seized from the defendant,
belonged to Peru based on its national patrimony law.92
The court analyzed Peru's national patrimony laws and found that
they did not clearly vest title of cultural property to Peru. On the
contrary, both the 1929 and 1985 laws allowed ownership of such
property by private individuals so long as they were registered in a
national registry.93 The laws only prevented exportation of such artifacts
and did not give the Peruvian government clear ownership.94 In addition,
the court considered expert testimony that the country the artifacts came
from could not be established since many neighboring nations, such as
Columbia, Bolivia, and Ecuador, have similar pre-Columbian artifacts.
Moreover, Peru had to establish it was the legal owner at the time of the
removal. 6 Since its own laws did not sufficiently vest title to Peru, Peru
could not establish it was the legal owner.' Johnson's purchase in good
faith over the years was also factor. 8 There was no evidence that Johnson
ever knew that the artifacts were stolen. 99
Under Johnson, in order for a foreign nation to assert ownership
under its national patrimony laws, it must show (i) that the government
was the owner of such artifacts at the time the defendant took possession
of the artifacts or removed them from that country; (2) that the artifacts
in question came from that country; and (3) that the country's patrimony
laws are clear and unambiguous." Because most looted or stolen cultural
property lacks any provenance (any clues to which country and which
culture it came from), it is often difficult to ascertain when such an object
was stolen. The strict requirements of Johnson, while setting clear
guidelines, place a heavy burden on the foreign nation requesting
repatriation of its cultural property.
90. 720

F. Supp 8io, 812-14 (C.D. Cal. 1989).

91. Id. at 81o.
92. Id. at811.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
Too.

Id. at 813-14. It is unclear, however, whether Peru ever established such a registry.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812, 814.
Id.
Id. at 812-14.
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Subsequent cases applied the Johnson requirements. For example, in
Turkey v. OKS Partners,Turkey brought suit demanding the return of
the Elmali Hoard.'°l The Hoard consisted of about two thousand ancient
Greek and Hellenic coins that were illegally excavated from Turkey and
smuggled out of the country in 1984. '02 According to Turkish officials,
three peasant farmers discovered the collection using a hand-held metal
detector, then sold them to smugglers in Istanbul. 3 The Elmali Hoard
ended up in Germany where William Koch, an American businessman
and millionaire, and his partners purchased it.'" The court, after hearing
expert testimony, determined that Turkey's national patrimony laws
were sufficiently clear to assert title to the coins.'" The defendants did
not contest that the coins were smuggled out of the country after Turkey
had enacted its patrimony laws. I 6 The court determined that Turkey had
a "sufficient proprietary interest" so the court denied defendant's
request for summary judgment, holding Turkey had a valid action for
replevin."° Turkey still had the burden of showing that the coins came
from Turkey.' 8 Turkey in a subsequent motion for partial summary
judgment against the defendants for replevin and conversion argued that
the defendants' own admissions and various other scholarly articles
showed the coins were the Elmali Hoard and they came from Turkey.'"
The court, however, denied Turkey's request in the interest of fairness
because the motion was made too close to trial."' The parties settled
before trial."' The defendants returned the coins and Turkey agreed to
special appreciation for the
display them with a plaque stating, "With
"1 2
American businessman William I. Koch."
Another case involved silver treasure that allegedly came from
Croatia and/or Hungary." 3 The treasure consisted of 1400 year-old
engraved silver plates, vases, basins and other pieces that may have
IoI. Turkey v. OKS Partners (OKS PartnersI), No. 8 9 - 3 o6i-WJS, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032, at
I1 (D. Mass. June 8, 1994).
1O2. Id. at *2. The coins were estimated to be 2,4oo years old and valued between $25-3o million.
Ancient Coin Collection to be Returned to Turkey, Cm. TRlB., March 4, 1999, at C2.
103. Anne E. Kornblut, In settlement, Koch to return coins to Turkey, BosToN GLOBE, March 5,
1999, at Ai.
Io4. Ancient Coin Collection to be Returned to Turkey, supra note 102.
105. OKS Partners1, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032, at *3-4.
o6. Id. at *3.

107. Id. at *8-9.
io8. Turkey v. OKS Partners (OKS Partners I),
23526.
1o9. Id. at *4-5.

No. 89-CV-3o6i-RGS 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

i to. Id. at *6.
lii. Kornblut,supra note 103.
112. Id.
113. Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton 1987 Settlement, 61o N.Y.S.2d 263, 264
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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belonged to a Roman military commander named Sevso. 14 Croatia and
Hungary alleged that the silver was excavated in their respective
countries and then illegally smuggled." 5 The current owner, the Lord of
Northampton, began purchasing the pieces from a Lebanese dealer in
Switzerland in the i98os.",6 Croatia and Hungary sued the Lord of
Northampton after Sotheby's displayed the silver in New York City."7
After a seven-week trial, the jury awarded the treasure to the Lord of
Northhampton."' On appeal, New York State Supreme Court did not
even discuss Croatia's patrimony laws because it was unclear whether the
treasure was found in Croatia, Hungary or Lebanon."9 According to the
court, "the burden was solely on Croatia and Hungary to prove the findsite of the Treasure .....
The New York State Court of Appeals denied
Croatia's and Hungary's petition for review. 2 '
In these cases, even though the courts recognized the national
patrimony laws, the foreign nation had to show that the cultural property
was discovered within the borders of th6 respective countries. 2" Because
many of these artifacts are often illegally excavated, it is difficult to show
by a preponderance of evidence that they came from a particular site in a
particular country, especially when the ancient cultural boundaries do
not correspond to present-day political borders. The cases above
demonstrate the high burden of proof a foreign country must meet in
order to recover its cultural property.
Another obstacle foreign nations must face is the uncertainty of
whether other circuits and lower courts will recognize and address a
foreign nation's patrimony law. United States v. Antique Platterof Gold,
involved a gold Phiale, an antique platter of Sicilian origin believed to be
from the 4th Century B.C.'23 The Phiale's provenance was unknown until
198o when it was sold to a coin dealer in Sicily.' 4 An art dealer in New
York, Robert Haber, came across the Phiale in i99I,and negotiated the
purchase between Michael Steinhardt and the former owner in Sicily.' 5
Steinhardt paid $I.2 million for the Phiale.26 On entering the United
114. 2 Nations Lose Claim to Old Silver, N.Y. TIMES, September 23, 1994, at Ci8.
115. Marquess wins claim to treasure, THE INDEPENDENT (London), November 5, 1995, at 7.
i6. British Lord Gets Right To Auction Roman Silver, L.A. TMES, November 5, 1993, at A39.
117. 2 Nations Lose Claim to Old Silver, supranote 114.
Ii8. Marquess wins claim to treasure,supra note 115.

i19. Trustee of the Marquess, 6io N.Y.S.2d at 264.
120. Id. at 265.
121. Croatia v. Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton 1987 Settlement, 642 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y.
1994).

122. Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 81o, 812 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Trustee of the Marquess, 6io N.Y.S.2d

at 264.
123.
124.
125.
126.

184 F. 3 d i3i, 133 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.

March 2005]

ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN PATRIMONY LAWS

763

States, Haber listed the Phiale's country of origin as Switzerland, and
listed the value as $250,000 on customs forms. 2 7 Urged by Italy, the
United States brought a civil forfeiture action against the Phiale based on
Haber's false declarations on customs forms."'
The issue on appeal was whether Haber's false declarations were
material enough to justify forfeiture under i8 U.S.C. § 542, which
prohibits the making of false statements to custom officials when
importing an item into the United States.' 9 The Second Circuit held that
lying about the country of origin is material because custom officials are
authorized to seize property that is stolen, and knowing where the items
came from is relevant to that inquiry. 3 In addition, the Second Circuit
recognized that custom officials were authorized to seize cultural
property pursuant to the NSPA and McClain I'' Steinhardt argued that
McClain was decided incorrectly, but the Second Circuit avoided that
argument by noting that McClain at least provided a colorable claim for
customs to seize the Phiale.' 3' The court required Steinhardt to hand over33
the gold Phiale to the government, and it was returned to Italy.
Steinhardt lost the $1.2 million he had paid for it." While the Second
Circuit did not rule on whether the NSPA applies to ownership of
artifacts based on Italy's patrimony laws, it was willing to accept McClain
I as authorizing seizure of the Phiale' 35by custom officials, even if Italy's
claim might "ultimately fail in court.'

One author has rejected the contention that the Second Circuit in
Antique Platter of Gold was unwilling to discuss Italy's national
patrimony laws because there was an easier way to decide the case
through customs forfeiture., 6 Instead, she argues that because of the high
standard of proof required, it may have been troublesome to justify
seizure under the NSPA as foreign patrimony laws are often insufficient
to assert title because they are vague.'37 In addition, Italy, according to
Johnson, would have the burden of showing that the Phiale did indeed
come from Italy and that it was incapable of being privately possessed.
The recent case of United States v. Schultz provided the Second
Id.
Id. at 134. See i8 U.S.C. § 545 (2oo).
Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3 d at 135.
Id. at 137.
131. Id. (foreign patrimony laws vested valid title to the state).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.at i4o.
135. Id. at 134. Under McClain I, the defendants can be prosecuted under the NSPA through
claims of ownership by national patrimony if those laws are clear and unambiguous.
136. Ann Brickley, Note, McClain Untarnished: The NSPA Shines Through the Phiale
Controversy, Io DEPAUL-LCA J.ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 315, 354 (2000).
137. Id.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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Circuit a second opportunity to address and evaluate foreign nations'
patrimony laws.' 38 The Second Circuit was faced with evaluating,
adapting, or adding on to the factors listed in Johnson, or creating their
own guidelines for what a country should do if it wanted to retrieve its
stolen cultural patrimony.'39
1II.

UNITED STATES V. SCHULTZ REEVALUATES THE BURDEN OF PROOF
REQUIRED FOR A FOREIGN NATION TO SHOW OWNERSHIP OF ITS
CULTURAL PROPERTY

The facts of United States v. Schultz are dramatic. The defendant,
Frederick H. Schultz Jr., was an urban, well-educated antiquities
dealer.'4" Schultz was the president until 200i of the National Association
of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art and had advised the
United States government on its policy and laws relating to cultural
property of nations, making him the most powerful individual in the
antiques market.'4 ' In i99i, Schultz met Jonathan Tokely Parry, a British
antiques dealer who had recently acquired a sculpture, the head of43
Amenhotep III42 (an Egyptian pharaoh in the 14th century B.C.).'
Parry arranged for the sale of the head to Schultz and they both decided
to create a false provenance for the sculpture.'" They created the
"Thomas Alcock Collection," Alcock being a "relative" of Parry who
took the sculpture out of Egypt in 1920. I' With Schultz's knowledge,
Parry made labels to resemble the style from the 1920s and restored the
head using a popular 1920S method.' 6 Schultz bought the head for
$8oo,ooo and sold it to a privatecollector for $1.2 million.'47 For the next
five years, Schultz and Parry became partners in smuggling Egyptian
antiquities into America for sale under the fictitious "Thomas Alcock
Collection," even while Parry was serving time in prison.'48 When a
Scotland Yard Detective became suspicious of Parry's activities, he
investigated Parry and discovered routine correspondence between Parry
and Schultz.'49 The correspondence implicated Schultz as the United
States purchaser of pieces from the "Thomas Alcock Collection" and
showed that he knew the collection was fake and that the artifacts were
138. See 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003).

139. See id.
140. Wilson, supra note 56.
141. Id.

United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396.
143. Celestin Bohlen, Illicit Antiquities and a Test Case Fit for Solomon; The Trial of a Dealer
Divides the Art World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Ei.
144. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396.
142.

145. Id.

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 396-98.
Wilson, supra note 56.
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stolen.'50 Schultz was charged with conspiring to receive stolen Egyptian
goods under the NSPA.'5 ' Schultz's arrest "sent a chill through antiques
dealers" who feared their ability to collect cultural property, whose
provenance is hard to discern, would be hindered by the threat of
forfeiture and possible criminal liability.'52
Schultz was convicted and sentenced to thirty-three months in prison
and fined $5o,ooo.'"' On appeal to the Second Circuit, Schultz argued that
NSPA was not meant to be used in cases involving ownership of cultural
property.' 54 He argued, furthermore, that Egyptian antiquities were not
owned by any individual, and therefore were not "stolen."' 55 The Second
Circuit asserted that Schultz would be in violation of the NSPA if he
conspired to receive items belonging to the government of Egypt, which
did not give consent.'16
The Second Circuit first had to determine whether Egyptian
patrimony laws sufficiently gave title to the government.'57 The Second
Circuit articulated that a foreign government must have a "declaration of58
national ownership;" a violation of export laws would not suffice.'
According to Egyptian Law II7, "The Law on the Protection of
Antiquities," Egypt declared all antiquities discovered after its
enactment (1983) property of the government.'59 Antiquities owned
before 1983 were exempt if the private owner could demonstrate his
ownership prior to 1983, and show that these antiquities were registered
and recorded.' 6 After considering expert testimony and examining the
plain text of the law, the court found Law i17 was sufficiently clear in
establishing government ownership of all artifacts and antiquities found
after I983. Schultz argued that national patrimony laws did not vest
true title in the government, but the Second Circuit agreed with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in McClain II that national patrimony laws that clearly
vested title in the government were valid. 162 Since the evidence
established that the head of Amenhotep and accompanying artifacts
were not privately owned before 1983, and it was clear that they were
removed from the country in I99I, the court was willing to uphold

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 395.
Bohlen, supra note 143, at Ei.
Celestine Bohlen, Antiquities Dealer is Sentenced to Prison,N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at Ei.

Schultz, 333 F.3d at 396.
Id.

156. Id.at 399.
157. Id.
i58. Id at 403-04 (quoting McClain 11,593 F.2d 658, 659 (5th Cir. 1979)).
159. Id.
i6o. Id.
I61. Id. at 399-402.
162. Id.at 403.
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63
Schultz's conviction under the NSPA.'
Another important factor in the Second Circuit's decision was that
Egypt had criminal penalties for offenders who violated its national
patrimony laws.' 64 An Egyptian government agent expert testified that at
least 400 Egyptian officers were employed to investigate and prosecute
individuals for violating its national patrimony laws.'6 ' Most of their
arrests involved people who were trafficking antiquities within Egypt
contrary to Law I17, as opposed to those attempting to export them
illegally from the country. Egypt's law, therefore, was not illusory and
was enforced even against its own nationals.
The Second Circuit in Schultz established what a foreign nation must
demonstrate in order to prove ownership through its national patrimony
laws. The foreign government must show: (i)it was the owner of such
artifacts at the time the defendant took possession of the artifacts or
removed them from that country; (2) that the artifacts in question came
from that country; (3) that its patrimony laws are clear and unambiguous;
and (4)that the government enforces such laws.'6 7 The Second Circuit
added an additional requirement to the Johnson factors: National
patrimony laws must be enforced by officials in their own countries so
that such laws are not illusory.' 68 This makes it even more burdensome
for a nation to retrieve its cultural property, especially since many poorer
countries in Africa, Asia and South America, which are rich in artifacts
and antiquities, do not have the fund resources to rigorously prosecute
violations of patrimony laws.
During Schultz's trial, Christie's Auction House, the National
Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art, and the Art Dealers
Association of America jointly submitted an amicus brief arguing that
upholding Shultz's conviction would hurt the art market.' 69 They asked
the Second Circuit to consider that"[t]he inevitable effect of subjecting
US citizens to the risk of imprisonment for violating foreign patrimony
laws is that the dealers, collectors and museums will be forced to
abandon the trade and collection of any objects that any foreign
government may unilaterally claim as its 'cultural patrimony.""'7 It is
doubtful that the ruling in Schultz would seriously hurt the art market
because it requires a foreign nation to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it is indeed the true owner of such cultural property and

63. Id. at 396-98.
I64. Id. at 400.
165. Id. at 4oI

i66. Id.
167. Id. at 398-4ol.
68. Id. at 401.
169. Id. at 398.
170. Id.
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that it enforces its laws to protect its cultural property. In addition, only
the Second and Fifth Circuits have articulated what a foreign nation must
show to prove its cultural property was "stolen." Other circuits may not
recognize a foreign nation's patrimony laws, especially when many
artifacts have been looted from sites and as a result never physically
possessed.
While the guidelines articulated by the Second Circuit seem harsh,
such requirements are reasonable, since a country cannot assert
ownership to property where evidence is either lacking or insufficient to
show that such artifacts came from that country. In addition, allowing a
foreign nation to claim ownership where its patrimony laws are vague or
are not enforced may violate due process. Shultz provides foreign nations
with clear guidelines of what they need to do in order to successfully
bring a claim of repatriation of cultural property in the United States.'7 '
In addition, the ruling in Schulz encourages foreign nations to take their
own measures to protect their cultural property by requiring nations to
create clear patrimony laws that are enforced. In January 2004, Schultz's
petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari was denied.'72
CONCLUSION

Courts in the past thirty years have struggled to find ways to
repatriate cultural property based on national patrimony laws because of
the difficulty in proof of ownership of cultural property and that United
States property laws do not have a concept of national patrimony. The
cases from Hollinsheadto Schultz demonstrate the courts' willingness to
consider a foreign nation's patrimony laws as evidence of ownership of
cultural property. The latest example, Schultz, is unique because it
provides nations with clear procedures on what a foreign nation must do
in order successfully retrieve their cultural objects smuggled into the
United States. While such requirements may seem harsh, they encourage
foreign nations to look internally first to protect their cultural property
by creating clear, unambiguous laws and enforcing them. So far, only the
Second and Fifth Circuits have articulated what a foreign nation must
show to prove its cultural property was "stolen." Even so, the guidelines
developed in Schultz will most likely influence other circuits' decisions. It
will be interesting to see whether other circuits in the future will adopt or
171. Other articles that have discussed the 2003 Schultz decision have recogized that it represents
the trend among United States courts to honor foreign patrimony laws and it reinforces the Fifth
Circuit's ruling in McClain. These articles, however, do not discuss the guidelines set forth for a
foreign nation to bring a claim of repatriation of cultural property and the additional factor of
enforcement Schultz imposes on foreign nations. See Laura M. Siegle, Note, United States v. Schultz:
Putting Cultural Property in its Place, 18 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 453, 469 (2004); Cynthia Ericson,
Note, United States of America v. Frederick Schultz: The National Stolen Property Act Revives the
Curse of the Pharaohs,12 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 509,523 (2004).
172. 540 U.S. 11o6 (2004).
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add to the Schultz requirements or create their own. The growing
awareness of the importance of cultural property and the
acknowledgement by courts of foreign patrimony laws may one day
provide a means for the Taita and Kenyan government to retrieve their
stolen ancestors' skulls.

